Abstract-The IEC 61499 standard proposes an event driven execution model for component based (in terms of Function Blocks), distributed industrial automation applications. However, the standard provides only an informal execution semantics, thus in consequence behavior and correctness relies on the design decisions made by the tool vendor. In this paper we present the formalization of a subset of the IEC 61499 standard in order to provide an underpinning for the static verification of Function Block models by means of deductive reasoning. Specifically, we contribute by addressing verification at the component, algorithm, and ECC levels. From Function Block descriptions, enriched with formal contracts, we show that correctness of component compositions, as well as functional and transitional behavior can be ensured. Feasibility of the approach is demonstrated by manually encoding a set of representative use-cases in WhyML, for which the verification conditions are automatically derived (through the Why3 platform) and discharged (using automatic SMT-based solvers). Furthermore, we discuss opportunities and challenges towards deriving certified executables for IEC 61499 models.
I. INTRODUCTION
The IEC 61499 standard offers an event driven execution model for distributed control applications. In the standard, the execution semantics is informally described. In consequence, the run-time behavior emerges from the specific interpretations of the execution semantics underlying the tool chain at hand. In consequence, correctness can only be argued from a deployment perspective, and not at the model level, with adversative implications to portability, inter-operability and re-use of IEC 61499 models. The standard was first established 2005 and later refined in 2012 [7] with the aim of addressing ambiguities documented in, e.g., [5] , [10] . However, issues still remain as is indicated by [16] .
Already in [19] , the need for formal methods to verify IEC 61499 models was identified. One way to address the issue of the correctness of IEC 61449 models is via static verification. If applied in the early stages of the design process inconsistencies of the specifications involved may be revealed, thus tedious re-iterations involving implementation, testing and debugging can be avoided. Furthermore, a static verification approach that embodies on the principles of design by contract [15] facilitates modular and compositional verification and enable an incremental design process allowing safe reuse of specifications (and accompanying implementations) in different settings. This becomes specially appealing for component based models such as IEC 61499. Despite the aforementioned advantages, design by contract based methods and tools have not yet reached the mainstream of industrial software development.
In this paper we outline and advocate an approach along the lines of deductive reasoning with potential to be automated down to a single click solution for verification the composition of Function Blocks that individually satisfy their contracts.
We also discuss and demonstrate advanced features regarding Function Block state preservation, state updates and transitional properties, which goes beyond the currently available, state-of-the-art automatic verification methods.
Our approach considers an encoding of the involved IEC 61449 components into the WhyML language of the Why3 program verification framework [4] . The behavior of the original IEC 61499 Function Block is translated into WhyML and enriched with the necessary contracts in the form of pre-and post-conditions, loop variants/invariants, among other program logic constructs rooted in Hoare logic [12] , and adopted a posteriori as the base for the design-by-contract paradigm of Meyers [15] . Henceforth, given a IEC 61499 Function block already translated into WhyML, the Why3 platform is capable of generating all the logical verification conditions necessary to ensure the correctness of the Function Block with respect to its specification. Moreover, the Why3 platform provides excellent support for both automatic and interactive theorem provers and therefore allows to discharge the verification conditions in an automatic or assisted way. Our approach is proof enabling and therefore opens up for development of certified implementations. Also, by using a deductive verification approach via Why3, our approach serves as a complement to the currently more adopted technology of model checking, which normally requires higher level models that results from abstracting of the system's concrete behavior.
II. BACKGROUND

A. IEC 61499
The IEC 61499 standard [13] provides a non-deterministic executable model for distributed control systems in terms of interacting function blocks. The execution semantics is informally defined, and thus subject to interpretation (as no official reference implementation is present). For the purpose of the presented work, we briefly summarize key features of the standard. For a comprehensive overview see e.g., [6] .
1) Design Elements:
In IEC 61499, all applications are built from Function Blocks (FBs). There are three types of FBs: Basic Function Blocks (BFBs), used to specify general behavior; Service Interface Function Blocks (SIFBs), used to interface the environment of a FB network; and finally, Composite Function Blocks (CFBs), emerging from a composition of BFBs and/or SIFBs and inner CFBs. In common, all FB types provide an interface defining input events with associated input ports (data connections), and output events with associated output ports. The operation of a BFB is defined (in a finite state machine like manner) by its Execution Control Chart (ECC), input/output events, and input/output/local variables. Each state in the ECC implies an ordered set of zero or more actions (algorithms to execute and output events to emit) when visited. An edge in the ECC defines a transition condition as either a single input event, a Boolean expression on input/output and local variables, or a combination thereof. The operation and implementation of SIFBs are left undefined in the standard. CFBs provides a hierarchical abstraction not considered in this work. An abstract view of the operation (input/output sequence) can optionally be defined as a Service Sequence (compliant to the ISO TR 8509 and ISO/IEC 10731:1994 standards).
The specification of data types in the IEC 61499 standard refers to that of IEC 61131-3 (the programming language annex), which includes basic types (Boolean, sized signed and unsigned integers with sub-ranges, etc.), fixed size strings, records and multi-dimensional arrays. Transition conditions and algorithms follow the language specification of IEC 61131-3, which includes Structured Text (ST) among other supported formats. The ST language is an imperative language with heritage to Pascal, and has become the de-facto choice to many industrial developments. The IEC 61499 standard does not exclude other languages for algorithm implementations. Through supporting the common data types of 61131-3, interoperability can be achieved.
The standard IEC 61499 also introduce the notions of adapters (for the grouping of event and data connections), applications and sub-applications (for the grouping of FBs), resources (for the scheduling of events), and devices for system deployment.
2) Function Block Execution Model:
The execution model is an asynchronous, event driven model. A device may provide one or more resource(s), responsible for the scheduling of events. The order of event delivery is undefined, and therefore the execution model is non-deterministic. The IEC 61499 standard defines the ECC execution semantics according to Figure 8 
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Taking as example the ECC exhibited in Figure 8 , on event delivery (t 1 ), the associated input data connections are sampled to the corresponding input data variables. For a BFB, the ECC transition conditions from the current state are checked in the order given by the occurrence in the underlying ECC representation (s 1 ). When a transition takes place (t 3 ), the actions of the target state are sequentially executed, implying potential local/output-variable updates and the generation of output events (s 2 ). When finished, that is when no more actions to execute, the input event is cleared (t 4 ), and further transition conditions (from the target state) are inspected (s 1 ). In this way, s 1 and s 2 are iterated until no further ECC transitions are possible (t 2 ), and the BFB returns to its idle state (s 0 ), awaiting for further events.
B. Why3
Why3 is a tool for deductive verification of programs. Why3 provides a rich language called WhyML that allows for users to simultaneously specify and program, with a clear separation between the purely logical part of the specification and the process of generating verification conditions from the actual programming code. Following this approach, Why3 also acts as a font-end to several external theorem proversboth automatic and user-assisted -that are used to discharge the verification conditions generated in a verification process. Furthermore, Why3 also enforces a notion of modular specification by providing users with the means to define theories that are reusable via cloning inside larger developments.
III. IEC 61499 STATIC VERIFICATION
In this Section we present verification approaches for a subset of the IEC 61499 standard from three viewpoints: application development by composing already available components; simple function block development, largely re-using ready made algorithms; and, finally, advanced/safety-critical function block development with focus on providing guarantees to state-full and transitional behavior. While advanced and safety-critical development usually requires experience and prior knowledge in the areas of contract-based development and formal verification, composition of FBs and re-use of algorithms can be put at the hands of the non-experts since their verification processes may be highly mechanized.
A. Component Level Verification
In this section we provide and hands-on example of our approach towards component level verification of IEC 61499 models. For that, we assume the following informal specification of a system comprised of:
• Two temperature sensors, where Sensor1 gives measures in Celsius c, in the range 0 ≤ c < 10 and Sensor2, gives measures in Fahrenheit f , in the range 32 ≤ f < 50.
• A simple safety controller that, assumes measures in Celsius c such that 0 ≤ c < 10, and that produce Bang-Bang (Boolean) output (Sensor1 < Sensor2).
• A generic conversion service, converting Celsius to, and from Fahrenheit.
1) IEC 61499 System Model:
A possible Function Block Network implementation for the running example is given in Figure 1 . The integer data type does not consider any specific IEC 61499/6113-3 encoding. Sensor1 and Sensor2 are instances of a generic FB_Sensor type. The (service) parameter DataType indicates measurement type, and Min/Max the value range. The FB_ConvService is deployed to convert the output values of Sensor2 to Celsius. The FB_Controller is an instance of the generic Bang-Bang controller with Min/Max defining the allowed control range in Celsius.
The ECC for the FB_ConvService is presented in Figure 2 and invokes the corresponding conversion algorithm according to received event. The controller can be implemented in a similar fashion like is shown in Figure 3 . 2) WhyML Verification Model: We now aim to verify, by means of formal contracts, the compositional soundness at the FB network level. Notice that here all FBs involved are essentially stateless, i.e., state transition conditions and algorithms depend neither on the ECC state, nor on the local/output variables as depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3 . This allows, in this specific case and from a contract perspective, to consider output variables as functions from input variables. Section V provides a discussion on the general case.
With the outset of state independency, we can construct contracts at the BFB/SFB level in a straightforward manner. We utilize the module system of Why3, which facilitates the separation of concerns, and start by defining common data types for the components.
3) WhyML Data: Data types are defined as traditionally supported in functional programming. The metric_t type is an algebraic data type whose constructors define an enumeration of the supported temperature domains, while the val_t type declaration defined a pair where the left elements is an integer, and the right one is a value of metric_t. These types can now be used within the Data module, or imported in other models, like is exemplified in the module Test where we declare a function instance test instance of type val_t returning the pair made by the integer value 3 and the metric value Fahrenheit. We first define a generic sensor model SensorGen. This module is parametrized by the constants min, max and metric which will be later instantiated to define the concrete models for Sensor1 and Sensor2. Besides these three parameters, the module SensorGen also specifies a predicate that checks if a value of type val_t is within the expected bounds, a function red that is responsible for reading a val_t value and check that it is in range via the in_range predicate, and a function range_of that determines that calculates between the bound of the range under consideration for sensor data. : int = 50 constant s2_metric : metric_t = Fahrenheit clone export SensorGen with constant min = s2_min, constant max = s2_max, constant metric = s2_metric end 6) WhyML SensorTest: Before we put the complete system together, we demonstrate how verification in Why3 can be put to use. First, we declare the WhyML modules Sensor1 and Senson2 that specify each of the sensors classes considered in the system. Then, in the implementation module SensorTest, we build sensor instances S1 and S2 for the specification modules Sensor1 and Senson2, respectively, and also define a set of assertions that assert that both sensor instances have positive range, that assert that all readings fall within the range of respective sensor, and that assert that values of S1 is within the range of S2. The verification results, using as backend the automatic theorem prover Alt-Ergo [8] , is that the first three assertions pass while the forth fails (as expected) as the predicate in_range requires equal metrics. The Why3 verification interface and produced results is depicted in Figure  4 . Notice that SensorTest is just an example to demonstrate the verification process and thus not part of the system model. module SensorTest clone import Sensor1 as S1 clone import Sensor2 as S2 let test() = assert { S1.range_of() > 0 /\ S2.range_of() > 0}; let s1_v = S1.read() in let s2_v = S2.read() in assert { S1.in_range s1_v}; assert { S2.in_range s2_v}; assert { S1.in_range s2_v}; (s1_v, s2_v) end 7) WhyML ControlGen: The generic Bang-Bang controller specification is captured by the ControlGen module. It is parametrized by the range predicate (range_pred). It requires that incoming sensor values (s1 and s2) are within the defined range of the controller in order to ensure the result. ( * the range predicate is a parameter for the module * ) predicate in_range int val control (s1 s2 : value_t) : bool requires { in_range (to_Celsius s1) } requires { in_range (to_Celsius s2) } ensures { result = (to_Celsius s1 < to_Celsius s2) } end 8) WhyML System: Finally we can put the system together, and verify compositional soundness w.r.t the defined contracts. We define a concrete range predicate and use that to instantiate the ControlGen model. The system orchestration passes readings from sensors S1 and S2 to the controller instance. The result is scrutinized by an assertion to verify our expectations.
For the given orchestration, all verification conditions hold and are discharged by Alt-Ergo prover through Why3 and therefore we can conclude the composition to be correct. Counter-examples can be straightforwardly devised, e.g, by limiting the control range, and/or increasing the sensor range(s). The development is available on request, and all examples will replay using Why3 without the need for any additional libraries.
module System clone import Sensor1 as S1 clone import Sensor2 as S2 ( * should work in Celsius range 0 <= c < 10 * ) predicate range (c:int) = 0 <= c < 10 clone import ControlGen with predicate in_range = range let orchestration () = ( * take readings from the sensors * ) let s1_v = S1.read () in let s2_v = S2.read () in ( * present readings to the controller * ) let bang = control s1_v s2_v in ( * make sure the controller meets our expectations * ) assert { match bang with | True -> to_Celsius s1_v < to_Celsius s2_v | False -> to_Celsius s1_v >= to_Celsius s2_v end } end 9) Summary: We have shown how contracts at the component level can be specified for the IEC 61499 standard, and we have demonstrated that the verification conditions for safe compositions can be discharged by automatic solvers. With end-users in mind (e.g., plant operators and system maintainers) mechanization and ease of use are of paramount importance. To this end, the proposed approach is clearly promising, allowing the standard library of IEC 61499 and vendor specific I/O blocks to be designed by expert engineers in the field and made available as trusted, contract carrying preverified components, enabling safe orchestration by the enduser. As exemplified, verification goes far beyond traditional type checking of interfaces as functional and logical properties can be captured.
B. Algorithm Level Verification
In the previous section we were dealing with specifications (contracts) at the component (Function Block) level, without any consideration of underlying implementations. Here we will demonstrate how rigorous specifications (and implementations) can be formulated for BFB algorithms. Again we take the outset of a running example, capturing key aspects and demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed approach.
Let us assume an informal specification of FB_Sort with the corresponding interface depicted in Figure 5 . On the arrival of ISortArray, the output integer array oArray should take on the sorted values (index 0 being the lowest) of the input integer array IArray and the associated OSortEvent should be triggered. Moreover, on the arrival of ISortElem, the IElem integer value should be sorted into the current oArray, and OElem should take on the overflowing integer value and the event OSortElem should be triggered. We may assume a fixed array length of 10, and initial values of all variables to be 0.
1) FB_Variables:
In order to formalize algorithm contracts, we need a representation for FB variables. To this end, we utilize a record type declaration as defined in the module FB_Variables. The standard library of Why3 provides polymorphic mutable arrays of fixed length. We use the integer type without consideration of specific IEC 61499/61131-3 encoding. The fields iElem and oElem are declared as mutable, thus allowing them to be updated. The well_formed predicate ensures a notion of well-formed arrays w.r.t. the length of the input and output arrays. We define the mk_variables contract in order to enforce proper initialization according to the FB specification. 3) Algorithm Implementations: The Why3 platform ships with a rich standard library and set of examples 2 . Among these examples we find two imperative implementations of in-place sorting of integer arrays (InsertionSortNaive and InsertionSort, the latter reducing the number of swap operations). Both implementations are certified (pre-verified) to the sorted predicate (defined in array.IntArraySorted), and can thus safely be re-used in any setting of integer array sorting.
As applied in our example, the user can at a later stage interchangeably chose in between the FB_SortSpec which provides a mere specification for high level verification, or FB_SortNaive / FB_SortOpt which provide refined implementations allowing the extraction of certified code. Let us now focus on the sort_elem and sketch a possible implementation below. In order to use the pre-verified inplace sorting algorithms, we need to allocate a local array a (with values of oArray appended with iElem). To facilitate development, we define a module ArrayAux (not depicted here) that provides singleton arrays, appending a single element (append_last) and splitting out last element (split_last) together with accompanying predicates and lemmas. As the length of arrays is non-mutable, this implies allocation and copying. 
oElem <-t end
For the verification, we introduce ghost variables (and code), which during later extraction are omitted from the generated code 3 . The complete set of verification conditions are discharged by Alt-Ergo (after splitting VCs at the top-level) within 10 seconds on an ordinary i7 based laptop, assigned 2 cores.
4) Summary:
We have shown how FB variables can be declared and how contracts for algorithms (operating on the FB variables) can be specified.Moreover, we have demonstrated how implementation refinement can re-use pre-defined/verified data structures and that complex functional behavior (such as sorting) can be automatically discharged through the Why3 platform. Building on the existing Why3 library and the rich set of examples and gallery, new specifications and corresponding certified implementations can be designed for the specific application at hand, and/or stored for future re-use.
C. ECC Level Verification
In the previous Sections, we presented methods that leads us towards highly mechanized verification at the component and algorithm level of the IEC 61499 standard. In this Section we focus on advanced features considering the transitional properties of BFBs. Mastering those, the skilled engineer may provide advanced contract carrying FBs and algorithms for safe re-use.
1) ECC Execution Model:
As briefly reviewed in Section II-A, the standard provides an informal execution semantics with the consequence of incompatible run-time environments due to tool dependent interpretations. Moreover, the verification becomes deployment-specific, as a consistent underpinning is lacking. The issue has been acknowledged and various formalization have been proposed. A particular problem to that end is the potential non-termination of ECC transitions. The standard informally requires termination at the algorithm level and thus may be used as an outset for well-formedness. Our proposed modeling in terms of Why3 largely helps to that end, as termination for recursion as well as loops are required in terms of well-founded and strictly decreasing variant's.
However, ECC termination is not explicitly treated by the standard, and is thus only an informal assumption on any correct implementation. However, by introducing restrictions to the execution model, the general underlying halting problem can be circumvented and termination granted [14] . Based on the observation that transitions involving event conditions can only be taken as the first step of a transition chain, wellformedness can be stated by the non-existence of connected components of the ECC graph after removing all edges with associated event conditions.
In this work, we relax the well-formedness condition of [14] allowing all models for which an upper bound is given to the number of times each ECC node is visited on behalf on a triggering event. While deriving the upper bound in general is an undecidable problem, we foresee restrictions based on well-founded relations to be applicable, but out of scope for this presentation.
The presented modeling and verification approach focus the internal behavior of BFBs, while modeling resource level event dispatching and data variable propagation is left for future work 4 .
2) Informal System description: Assume a system consisting of: two valves, each controlled by the events OE_Open/OE_Close and sensed by the event IE_Closed (emitted when valve reaches its closed position), and a (safety) controller FB_Save with inputs IE_Open1/2, IE_Close1/2, and IE_Closed1/2 that shall:
• close both valves on IE_INIT;
• ensure that valve 1 should not be opened unless valve 2 is closed; and
• valve 2 should not be opened unless valve 1 is closed.
3) System Model: As the system is purely event based, we must introduce the local (Boolean) variables IS_CL1 and IS_CL2 to hold the (virtual) states of valves 1 and 2 respectively. The safety controller FB_Safe component and corresponding ECC are depicted in Figures 6 and 7 respectively. Table I , is modelled by the function ecc_ex_action, presented below, in a straightforward manner. The algorithms (operating on the variables s.v) are inlined for brevity. In a real setting algorithms may be externally defined. The resulting set of output events is presented as a potentially empty (Nil) list. ad-hoc. However, we foresee that the encoding is largely mechanizable if enriching the IEC 61499 input format with contract information, following the lines of ACSL [2] and SPARK [1] .
To this end, suitable representations for the IEC 61499/IEC 61131-3 data types should be defined in WhyML and deployed for automatic translation. The Why3 standard library int provides ranged integers, floating_point (according to IEEE-754), mach.int (arithmetics for programs, e.g., on Int32, UInt32, etc.), and so forth, which in effect embody the data types of IEC 61131-3.
At the algorithm level, the IEC 61499 endorses the IEC 61131-3 Structured Text language. With its heritage to Pascal, and relative simplicity, translation into WhyML is foreseeable. To the end of certification through extraction, one could also think of translations from a subset of WhyML into structured text. The latter would enable re-using a subset of existing preverified algorithms and data structures already available. To this end, the extraction process in Why3 is highly configurable through a driver architecture.
In order to further improve usability, the Why3 platform provides a rich programming API giving access to the internal data structures and functions of Why3. This provides ample opportunities towards tool-integration, bridging the gap in between the FB design and verification processes. To this end, we foresee to develop a verification server that establishes a bridge between the FB IDE (e.g., the open source 4DIAC tool) and the Why3 platform.
V. RELATED AND FUTURE WORK
Formal verification of IEC 61499 has been studied mainly from the perspective of model checking, see e.g., the survey [11] . A recent approach utilizing abstract state machines and symbolic model checking is proposed in [17] , allowing the verification of non-boolean conditions. Our approach differs by taking a deductive verification approach, which avoids potential state space explosion problems that are common when using model checking. Furthermore, our approach follows the lines of certified programming -allowing guarantees to the functional correctness of the implementation w.r.t its specification -and undertakes a contract based approach to compositional verification. This opens up for compositional and hierarchical verification following the lines of [9] . Initial work in this direction, for compositional verification of IEC 61499 has recently been proposed [18] . However, the possibility to express behaviour at the component level is limited to service sequences in IEC 61499, which defines the set of event sequences acceptable for the function blocks without any notions of timing, data, and state. An extension to behavioural types expressed in terms of extended regular expressions has recently been proposed in [21] . While our approach focus on static verification, the work presented in [21] in targets run-time monitoring. Another related approach to IEC 61499 verification, takes the outset of observers [3] , function blocks added to the system model for the purpose of verification, allowing static reachability analysis of erroneous states through model checking.
Our deductive verification approach takes the outset of manually specified contracts at the component, algorithm and ECC levels. However, to manually specify the stateful and transitional behaviour of complex function blocks may become challenging and with limited usability. To this end, and besides the aforementioned future work (Section IV), we focus current and future work on the automatic contract generation from the IEC 61499 models at the component (function block) level. However, as mentioned, the expressiveness of behaviour specification at the component level is very week. To this end, extensions such as behavioural types [21] are promising, allowing succinct and versatile specification for the component interface.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have established a foundation for reasoning on a subset of IEC 61499 models by means of contracts. Specifically we have targeted verification at the component, algorithm and ECC levels. The feasibility of the approach has been demonstrated on a set of representative use-cases, for which assertions on compositional soundness, functional correctness and non-trivial safety conditions have been automatically generated and effectively discharged through the Why3 platform. The proposed method provides ample opportunities for mechanization as a majority of the presented encodings in WhyML can be straightforwardly derived from IEC 61499 models. Moreover, the design by contract approach is proof enabling and allows for the extraction of certified implementations. Future work includes further mechanization and integration to IEC 61499 tool-chains, aspects of code certification, and to establish semantics for reasoning on causal and timely properties on IEC 61499 models.
